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Abstract
Patronage is a byword for poor performance, yet it remains pervasive. We
study the selection effects of patronage in the world’s most successful navy
– the British Royal Navy between 1690 and 1849. Using newly collected data
on the battle performance of more than 5,800 naval officers promoted – with
and without family ties – to the top of the navy hierarchy, we find that con-
nected promotees outperformed unconnected ones. There was substantial het-
erogeneity among the admirals in charge of promotions. Discretion over ap-
pointments thus created scope for ”good” and ”bad” patronage. Because most
admirals promoted on the basis of merit and did not favor their kin, the overall
selection effect of patronage was positive.
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1 Introduction
A growing literature views the recruitment and allocation of public employ-
ees as a key determinant of state capacity and economic performance (Rauch
and Evans, 2000; Dal Bo´ et al., 2013; Finan et al., 2017). Discretion in public ap-
pointments, or patronage,1 is often regarded as a major source of inefficiency:
it can lead to corrupt appointments, distort incentives, and undermine state
effectiveness (Grindle, 2012).
Yet it is ambiguous, in theory, how patronage affects performance. Discre-
tion over appointments has been shown to bias the allocation of public-sector
positions (Akthari et al., 2018; Colonnelli et al., 2018; Xu, 2018). At the same
time, such discretion could improve selection, by allowing principals to use
their private information – especially in environments where performance is
difficult to evaluate (Prendergast and Topel, 1996; Allen, 2011). The ubiquity of
patronage, not only throughout history but even in developed countries today,
raises an intriguing question: are there any environments in which discretion
in the allocation of public-sector positions is actually beneficial?
We examine the costs and benefits of patronage and demonstrate that it can,
indeed, lead to better selection. More specifically, we focus on the promotion
of officers in the British Royal Navy during its 18th-century heyday. Our paper
is the first to show empirically that, in a public-sector setting, patronage can
have a favorable effect overall by improving selection. The sign and size of
patronage effects depend on management style and on the extent of external
competitive pressures. Promotions in the Royal Navy during wartime were –
in comparison with peacetime – generally more merit based and resulted in
a better selection of naval officers. This outcome is in line with models that
1”Patronage” is defined as the discretionary appointment of individuals to governmental or po-
litical positions (Webster’s II New College Dictionary 1995).
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see warfare as a driver of state capacity (Tilly, 1990; Besley and Persson, 2010;
Gennaioli and Voth, 2015).2
The Royal Navy is a setting well suited to studying the selection effects of
patronage. First, it was a large, highly successful organization in which patron-
age was widespread. At its peak, the Royal Navy employed over 120,000 men,
operating hundreds of ships. Between 1690 and 1849, the Royal Navy fought
its way into the history books as the most successful navy on earth – playing a
crucial role in Britain’s rise as a global power (Kennedy, 2010). Officers of the
Royal Navy were highly trained specialists commanding ships with crews of
hundreds, often taking them to the farthest reaches of the globe. These officers
were also skilled military leaders who commanded battleships with as many
as 120 guns. Their career progression relied heavily on connections.
Second, the military provides a setting where objectives are clear and out-
comes are readily measurable. In contrast with civil administrators, who may
pursue multiple objectives, defeating the enemy at sea is the raison d’eˆtre of
naval officers: a ship either captures another vessel or is forced to surrender.
Third, the Navy was rife with principal–agent problems because communica-
tions were slow and because effort could not be verified (Allen, 2002, 2011).
Finally, the sheer size of the Navy and its intense fighting history during the
18th century allow us to observe – for many ships, crews, and captains – out-
comes as well as the promotion and allocation choices made by a large number
of decision makers: admirals of the Royal Navy.
Our study is based on the construction of a new, granular dataset. We as-
semble a yearly officer-ship–level panel, for the period 1690–1849, that covers
almost the entire universe of British naval officers and warships. The result-
ing “matched captain ship” dataset includes information on 5,848 officers as-
2As Fukuyama (2011, p. 113) argues: “at war, meritocracy is not a cultural norm but a condition
for survival”.
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signed to 3,904 ships. We also observe 4,193 promotion decisions made by 49
different Admiralty boards, which allows us to compare the promotion and
performance patterns of those selected under different naval administrations.
To measure patronage, we collect information on family ties between naval
officers and the two most senior naval leaders – the Lord Admiral and the Ad-
miral of the Fleet – from a large genealogical database. Regular turnover at
the top of the navy hierarchy (the “Admiralty”) generates shocks to the con-
nections of serving officers, which enables us to observe the same officer both
connected and unconnected to the organization’s apex.3 We measure perfor-
mance using battle outcomes: the number of captures, successful actions, and
enemy units destroyed. The selection effects of patronage are estimated in a
difference-in-differences (DiD) setting, in which we compare the performance
of connected and unconnected officers before and after their promotion to post-
captain. This promotion granted officers independent command over much
larger ships, substantially increasing their span of control.4
To guide our empirical analysis, we adapt a canonical model of statistical
discrimination to emphasize the central trade-off between information and bias
(Phelps, 1972). In our model, the principal (Admiralty) chooses to promote
a connected or unconnected agent (naval officer). The principal observes the
performance of agents with some error, but knows more about the underlying
ability of connected than of unconnected subordinates thanks to having better
information about the former. The principal may also be biased in the sense
3Connections to the very top were undoubtedly crucial because all promotions to “post” rank
had to be confirmed by the Admiralty in London. Nonetheless, it is likely that officers received
patronage also from their commanding captain and admiral.
4Prior to being made “post”, naval officers were typically employed in junior roles – for instance,
as lieutenants serving under a captain in overall command. Only when assigned to small (“un-
rated”) ships did they have command of a vessel. After being made “post”, naval officers had much
greater prospects of being assigned a ship and received automatic promotions based on seniority.
In contrast, lieutenants had little employment security, received no automatic promotions, and com-
manded at best a small vessel.
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of deriving a private benefit from exhibiting favoritism (i.e., promoting kin).
The net effect of patronage will thus depend on two key primitives: how well
principals observe performance, and the extent of bias.
We report three main results. First, we establish empirical patterns that
map directly onto our model. In particular, we confirm not only that promo-
tions are merit-based, but also that they are more so for officers connected to
the Admiralty. Seen through the lens of our model, this result is consistent
with better information and the absence (on average) of major biases.
Second, a comparison across promoted officers in an event study reveals
that officers promoted while connected to the Admiralty outperform uncon-
nected promotees thereafter. This positive performance difference persists over
time, is not driven by the assignment to better ships, and holds even for officers
whose promoting patron has rotated out of the Admiralty. To ensure that our
results are not driven by the preferential allocation of ships and assignments
to connected officers, we also perform a battle-level analysis. Thus we hand-
coded 94 fleet actions, 263 flotilla actions, and 172 single-ship actions. For fleet
and flotilla actions we show that, even conditional on being assigned to a par-
ticular position in the line of ships, connected promotees outperform; that is,
they are more likely than their unconnected peers to sink, burn, or capture en-
emy ships (and correspondingly less likely to lose their own). In single-ship
actions – chance encounters that provide exogenous variation in the matching
of officers to enemy ships – connected promotees win markedly more often. It
is interesting that this result is driven by a lower number of indecisive engage-
ments.5
Third, we test for heterogeneity as predicted by our model, examining pro-
motion decisions made under multiple Admiralties. We examine whether top
5The implication is that “fighting spirit”, or an unwillingness to break off engagement until a
decisive advantage has been gained, was a key characteristic of successful officers.
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“management teams” that made more merit-based promotions to post-rank
were also more likely to pick connected officers that performed well afterward.
These different “Admiralty styles” generate empirical variation in the model
parameters that govern whether patronage effects are positive or negative. In
line with theoretical predictions, we find that connected promotees outperform
unconnected ones even more so when the promoting Admiralty is more merit
oriented. In contrast, connected promotees perform worse the more biased the
promoting Admiralty is. Merit increases and bias decreases during periods of
major wars – times during which the Admiralty’s objectives are more closely
aligned with the organizational objective.
Discretion over appointments thus created scope for good and bad patron-
age in the Royal Navy. Absent such discretion, admirals could not have ex-
ploited private information to pick those best suited to the job. The price of dis-
cretion was that poor admirals could make poor choices, favoring low-ability
family relations or offspring of the political elite. On average, however, patron-
age made a positive contribution to the Royal Navy’s fighting record.6
Our results contribute to the literature on selection and incentives in the
public sector (Khan et al., 2015; Ashraf et al., 2016; Weaver, 2018; Ager et al.,
2019; Bertrand et al., 2019; Khan et al., 2019). Rational and complex military
organizations, such as the Royal Navy, foreshadowed the emergence of profes-
sionalized bureaucracies. Indeed, concepts such as meritocracy (often associ-
ated with “Weberian” bureaucracies) first emerged in the military. Although
a range of papers show that homophily matters for the allocation of positions
(see e.g. Azulai, 2017; Do et al., 2017), there is little systematic evidence on how
homophily affects performance. Exceptions include Xu (2018), who shows that
6We know that connected promotees in the Royal Navy fought better. Yet because we do not
have data on patronage in other navies, we do not know whether connectedness per se contributed
to Britain’s better relative performance.
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patronage disincentivizes favored colonial bureaucrats enough that they then
raised less revenue; Colonnelli et al. (2018), who report that winning municipal
mayors in Brazil employ less qualified personnel from their pool of support-
ers;7 Lott (2013), who establishes that political influence reduces the quality of
judges appointed to the bench in the United States; and Fisman et al. (2018),
who demonstrate that scholars at the Chinese Academy of Science have less
distinguished curricula vitae when they share hometown ties with admissions
committee members. In contrast, evidence on the positive effects of discre-
tion, including in family firms, are much more frequent in the private sector
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Fisman et al., 2017).8 Our theoretical framework –
which highlights the trade-off between information and bias – makes precise
the conditions under which patronage will have positive or negative effects
on performance. Whereas other studies have focused on the characteristics of
selected candidates, we examine the effect of selection on outcomes.
More broadly, our findings complement research on the role of social con-
nections and discrimination (Bertrand and Duflo, 2016; Ashraf and Bandiera,
2018) by providing public-sector evidence that underscores the importance of
“administrative styles” in predicting bias in promotions. We provide evidence
that the style of leaders is not only important for performance in the private sec-
tor but can also increase state effectiveness (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bloom
and Van Reenen, 2007; Rasul and Rogger, 2017). Based on captains command-
ing capital ships – complex hierarchical organizations with hundreds of per-
sonnel – our results resonate with the literature on the selection effects of CEOs
(Bertrand, 2009).9
7Brollo et al. (2017) document that, in closely contested elections’ in Brazil, the winning party
hires more of its own members – who are no less qualified (on average) than members of the oppo-
sition party.
8The exception is Hoffman et al. (2017); these authors find that private sector managers who
ignore test recommendations hire workers that end up having shorter tenures.
9Finally, our result that the less constrained selection of leaders can lead to greater variance in
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We also relate to the historical literature on the Royal Navy. Historians
have long attributed its superior performance to Britain’s financial prowess:
building, staffing, and maintaining large fleets and then supplying them ef-
fectively on the high seas for years (Dull, 2009; Rodger, 2005). Although most
of the literature is descriptive, economic analyses of navy performance have
stressed the role of high-powered incentives for officers and also for seamen.
More specifically, the Royal Navy created incentives and enforced rules that
compelled captains to fight (Allen, 2002), paid all the crew of successful ships
substantial prize money (Benjamin, 2005), promoted men from the lower deck
in response to performance (Benjamin and Thornberg, 2007), and successfully
solved incentive problems in the provisioning of food for the crews (a.k.a. the
victualling) of its large fleets (Allen, 2018). The Royal Navy also improved more
rapidly over time than its rivals, gathering more experience in naval warfare
and arguably learning more from it (Benjamin and Tifrea, 2007).10 We agree
that the Royal Navy’s carefully balanced system of incentives figured promi-
nently in its success. Yet for that system to work, the right men had to be in
command because real-time monitoring was de facto impossible (Allen, 2002).
We explore the role of patronage in selecting them.
Finally, this paper is related to previous work on the origins of state capac-
ity. A growing literature has emphasized the importance of military competi-
tion for state building (Tilly, 1990; Besley and Persson, 2010) and pointed out
that many of today’s underdeveloped countries are located in areas with few
interstate conflicts (Herbst, 2014). Contributions to the state-building literature
have typically focused on the growth of taxation (Besley and Persson, 2010;
Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). Our finding that meritocratic selection increased
performance echoes the findings of Jones and Olken (2005), who show that more autocratic regimes
experience more uneven growth.
10Benjamin and Tifrea (2007) also argue that patronage in the Royal Navy mainly hastened pro-
motions.
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during wartime suggests that there is another and perhaps equally important
channel from interstate conflict to state capacity – namely, improvements in the
selection of key state personnel.
2 Historical background
In this section we summarize the Navy’s organization, promotion system, and
officers’ incentives. We also identify the primary determinants of success in the
“Age of Sail” and discuss the nature of the patronage system.
2.1 Size and organization
The Royal Navy has its origins in the armed merchant ships that fought at the
behest of English kings and queens. The Spanish Armada’s attempted invasion
of England was defeated mainly by converted merchant ships (Rodger, 1999).
Britain’s Parliament in 1649 authorized the first large-scale program for build-
ing capital ships, the “Speaker” class (Dull, 2009). By the time of the Restora-
tion in 1660, Charles II controlled a permanent fleet of purpose-built warships
commanded by career officers (Rodger, 2005). As the frequency of warfare
increased after 1700, the Navy expanded. By the 18th century, Britain found
itself at war in one year out of three Brewer (1990) while the majority of govern-
ment spending – as in other European countries – was for war-related purposes
(Tilly, 1990; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015).
The Royal Navy absorbed a large share of overall military expenditures.
Between 1690 and 1810, it grew from 147 to 752 larger ships. Ship armaments
increased somewhat more slowly, from 10,000 to 43,000 guns. During peace-
time, the navy typically shrank to a quarter or a fifth of its wartime strength
(Figure 1). Of the more than 3,900 unique ships in our database, nearly a fourth
9
(957) were large battleships (known as “ships of the line”). Another 1,024 were
frigates; the rest were smaller, unrated ships typically sailed by lieutenants
serving as commanders.
Each individual ship required an enormous expenditure: “Even smaller
ships in the English navy of the 18th century cost more than the largest in-
dustrial companies had in capital” (Brewer, 1990). Pay for seamen along with
the cost of sails, cordage, food, powder, shot, and the spars all added to the
expense of running a fighting navy. Royal dockyards and private yards built
and repaired warships, and the Victualling Board bought and distributed pro-
visions for the ships (Baugh, 2015; Allen, 2018).
The Royal Navy was run by the Board of Admiralty, which consisted of sev-
eral Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty. These commissioners were a mix
of naval officers (“Sea Lords”) and politicians, and the Board’s president was
known as the First Lord of the Admiralty. The Admiralty devolved many pow-
ers and decisions to station commanders and to admirals commanding fleets.
Although the UK Cabinet set overall naval strategy, the Admiralty presided
over the naval administrative system. A crucial aspect of that power was the
control of officer appointments and assignments – directly for those serving in
home waters or indirectly for those serving at foreign stations, where appoint-
ments made by station chiefs were subject to confirmation by the Admiralty
(Pope, 2013).11
11There are numerous examples of the Admiralty overturning local station commanders’ recom-
mendations and provisional appointments; there are also many documented cases of the Admiralty
forcing appointments on local commanders, picking men who had not been recommended by the
station chief (Malcomson, 2007).
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2.2 Career progression
Most aspiring officers went to sea at an early age – 10 or 12 was common. Con-
nections usually mattered from the very first day, as most young gentlemen
were entered in a ship’s books through the patronage of a friendly captain. De-
pending on their age, they would either join as midshipmen or be promoted
to that position from able seaman or captain’s servant. Training was almost
entirely informal; the ship captain was in charge of organizing lessons in sea-
manship, gunnery, and navigation. Midshipmen who had served for six years
aboard Royal Navy ships, and who had absorbed all the material necessary
to fight and sail a ship, could apply for the rank of lieutenant; such appli-
cants were examined by a tribunal of active captains chosen by the Admiralty
(Pope, 2013). Although “interest” (i.e., connections) likely affected promotion
prospects at the margin, the examination itself was taken seriously. The Royal
Navy had no use use for lieutenants who were not highly competent seamen.
Upon receiving a commission, the new lieutenant had to wait for an ap-
pointment (and could easily end up “on the beach”, or on half-pay). Larger
ships would carry many lieutenants, and their role varied as a function of
seniority. Lieutenants attended to the day-to-day running of the ship, from
readying stores for long voyages to daily sailing and the commanding of gun
crews. They also kept the ship’s log, which was necessary for monitoring the
captain (Allen, 2002).
Lieutenants could also be appointed as “Master and Commander”. As
such, they would be in charge of a small vessel (typically sloops-of-war with
no more than 20 guns). Such ships often sailed with messages or were used to
intercept coastal traffic. Command of even a small vessel constituted a valuable
opportunity to distinguish oneself.12
12Although a lieutenant appointed as commander was in effect acting as the captain of a ship, he
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The decisive step in a naval officer’s career was promotion to post-captain –
that is, the officer in command of a larger vessel. Many lieutenants were never
promoted. Both performance and connections mattered for this consequential
promotion, but battlefield performance mattered above all else: “for a young
officer who hoped for command, or for post-rank, nothing was more swiftly
effective than to take an enemy ship of equal or greater force” (Rodger, 1986,
p. 295). Once appointed as a post-captain, further career progression was by
strict seniority. If a lieutenant was made “post” at a young age and continued
to receive ship assignments, eventual promotion to admiral was all but guaran-
teed as long as he survived. Initial appointment of post-captains was typically
to a sixth-rate or fifth-rate ship, frigates with 20–32 guns and a crew of 150–300.
Step by step, captains would then progress to larger and larger ships until they
were put in command of a first-rate ship of the line, carrying 80–120 guns and
a crew of 850 (Baugh, 2015).
Once they reached the top of the captain’s list, naval officers qualified for
promotion to admiral – first to rear admiral, then to vice admiral, and finally
to admiral. Each of these positions was assigned to a specific fleet (e.g., the
Admiral of the Red commanded the British Home Fleet). Admirals could also
find themselves without a command (“yellow admirals”), a form of early retire-
ment that allowed the Admiralty to promote younger men to command fleets
and squadrons.
2.3 Success in the Age of Sail
No European navy had a major technological advantage compared to its peers.
Shipbuilders competed vigorously with each other, and frequent captures of
would not yet have the rank of “captain” – although, out of courtesy, he would normally be referred
to as such.
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enemy ships disseminated innovations. British-built ships were not the best;
historians debate whether French-built vessels were better (Allen, 2002; Rodger,
1987), and the Spanish Santı´sima Trinidad was the largest warship of the age.
Naval engagements were nearly always decided by the relative size of fleets,
by the armament of individual vessels in ship-to-ship duels, and above all, by
the seamanship, fighting skill, and motivation of captains and their crew.
Despite the similarity of ships, battle outcomes for most of the 18th century
were heavily one-sided. During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the Royal
Navy lost only 166 ships (of which five were ships of the line) while inflicting
the loss of 1,201 ships (159 ships of the line) on its enemies. This “exchange
ratio” was a staggering 7:1 on average and 32:1 for battleships.13 According to
Forester (2012, p. 29),
the British Navy could look back with complacence over a record of
victories frequently gained and easily won. Time and time again it
had faced numerical odds and had emerged triumphant . . . There
had been single-ship actions too numerous to count, and in the great
majority of these actions British ships had been victorious, and often
over ships of greater tonnage, with more guns and larger crews.
Why did the Royal Navy outfight its enemies? Skill was one factor. Britain
could draw on the manpower of a large merchant navy – but then so could the
Dutch and French navies (Allen, 2002). In wartime, recruitment by force (“the
press”) was common and ensured that the Royal Navy had first pick of prime
seaman.14 Since Britain often blockaded enemy fleets, its seaman had more
13Most 18th-century conflicts resulted in similar ratios; during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763),
for instance, the Royal Navy was arguably even more successful than it was during 1793–1815 (Allen,
2002).
14Rodger (1987) analyzes the crews of several ships from the middle of the 18th century and finds
that the share of pressed men averaged 15%. Another 56% were volunteers, and 26% re-enlisted
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practice than their enemies. A highly professional officer corps also enhanced
the fighting power of the Royal Navy; in contrast to the British army, for exam-
ple, commissions could not be purchased but had to be earned through exams
and appointments.15 There were also no major organizational upheavals, such
as the drastic egalitarian reforms that undermined the fighting power of the
French Navy after 1793. Finally, there is some evidence that British crews sus-
tained a higher rate of fire than its foes – the result of extensive (albeit informal)
training.16
The principal challenge for a naval commander during the Age of Sail was
to find the enemy fleet. Without modern means of communication, visual con-
tact was necessary to bring fleets into action. Frigates serving as “eyes of the
fleet” were in high demand. Nonetheless, much of the naval history of the 18th
century consists of chance encounters and month-long cat-and-mouse chases,
such as the long-delayed meeting of the British and combined French–Spanish
fleets at Trafalgar (which followed a chase to the West Indies).
The Royal Navy had a number of structural advantages, but it also ob-
served self-imposed rules that contributed to its success (Allen, 2002). Chief
among these rules was a strong bias in favor of taking action against an en-
emy. Principal–agent problems are highly characteristic of military organiza-
tions (van Creveld, 2004) – and nowhere more so than on the high seas in the
Age of Sail, when messages from the Admiralty could take months to reach a
commander (Allen, 2002). From the mid-18th century onward, Navy regula-
tions did not even allow British captains to avoid confrontation with an enemy
of broadly similar size. Instead, they were required to do their utmost to attack
after having been “paid off” for their previous service. The rest of a ship’s company were officers.
15See Allen (2011) for a general theory of when purchasing commissions works better than pa-
tronage.
16Rodger (1987) cites several examples of British warships firing at a rate of one broadside every
minute or two.
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and defeat the enemy vessel.17 When efforts were deemed to be insufficient,
the consequences could be severe. Loss of a ship brought an automatic court
martial, and convicted navy officers could suffer the ultimate punishment. An
instructive case is that of Admiral Byng; he was executed for failing to capture,
as ordered, Menorca from the French in 1759. Contrast this with the behavior
of the Royal Navy’s main competitor:
French fleets never attacked, as indeed they had never attempted to
do since 1704. Their tactics when opposed by fleets of equal strength
were mainly defensive. (Tunstall and Tracy, 1990, p. 7).
2.4 Patronage in the Royal Navy
Patronage was an important factor in personnel decisions of the Royal Navy.
Boys joining a ship for the first time often did so through family connections;
and promotion to midshipman, lieutenant, and post-captain were all affected
by how much “influence” (i.e., connections) an officer had at higher levels of
the naval hierarchy, in Parliament, and at court. How could such a system
produce competent captains in large numbers?
A simple example can illustrate the extent to which nepotism pervaded
Navy careers. A young man, the sixth of eleven children of an Anglican rev-
erend, joins the Navy at age 13. He begins as a seaman serving on HMS Raisonnable,
which is commanded by his maternal uncle, Captain Maurice Suckling. Soon
he is promoted to midshipman and begins officer training. After serving in a
variety of ships, he is first appointed acting lieutenant. He passes the exami-
nation as lieutenant, aged 19, in front of an examining board presided over by
17“British commanders were expected to defeat enemy forces much stronger than their own . . .
In single ship actions, it was reckoned that a British ship had a good chance against an enemy of 50
per cent greater gun power and crew” (Lavery, 1998, p. 317).
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his uncle, who has in the meantime risen to the position of Comptroller of the
Navy, or the chairman of the Navy Board in charge of most Navy spending (ex-
cept wages) – that is, with responsibility for shipbuilding, repairs, victualling,
powder, and shot.
Immediately after his promotion, the young naval officer is appointed as
lieutenant in a 32-gun frigate, HMS Lowestoffe. After capturing various enemy
ships and taking prizes, the lieutenant is appointed commander of the tender
Little Lucy. The newly appointed commander makes a positive impression on
his superior, who therefore sends him to the flagship of Sir Peter Parker, ad-
miral at the Jamaica station. After a successful attack on a Spanish fort, Parker
puts his prote´ge´ in charge of HMS Hinchinbrook, a 28-gun frigate. He is thus
made a post-captain at age 21, an appointment decided by the local station
commander and confirmed by the Admiralty. Within two years, he has transi-
tioned from midshipman to captain of a major warship (Coleman, 2001).
The young man was, of course, Horatio Nelson – arguably one of history’s
most outstanding naval officers. He would later command the fleets that van-
quished enemy fleets at the Battle of Abukir and of Trafalgar. There is no ques-
tioning his various talents and abilities as a captain, naval commander, and
strategist. Yet without his uncle’s influence, Nelson – who had a weak consti-
tution that left him ill for months on end, was no great navigator, and who
suffered from seasickness all his life – would probably never have risen to the
top of the Navy hierarchy. Instead, patronage from several highly ranked offi-
cers ensured that he became one of the most rapidly promoted captains in the
Royal Navy.
Naval historians have indeed argued that patronage was a key determinant
of success:
16
successful patronage was the key to a successful career, the princi-
pal means by which a reliable ship’s company was cemented, and
one of the strongest social forces within the Navy. (Rodger, 1987,
p. 124)
power of patronage was the key to the eighteenth-century Admi-
ralty’s authority, the one element which counterbalanced weakness
to command and near inability to punish. (Rodger, 1984, p. 245)
Thus patronage, it is argued, enhanced the performance of the Royal Navy
because it facilitated selection based on ability. The skill and values of the offi-
cers choosing the next set of leaders were crucial:
we are mistaken to suppose that a system based on personal influ-
ence must necessarily have chosen unworthy men. This would have
been so if the persons with the power of choice had placed other
qualities above professional ability – for example . . . choosing offi-
cers only from noble blood, as the French navy normally did . . . a
system of patronage to identify and advance men of ability . . . might be at
least as efficient as any examination or annual report in bringing skillful
officers to the head of the profession. (Rodger, 1987, p. 275, emphasis
added)
patronage, properly used, did much to save the country in wartime
by giving outstanding men rapid promotion . . . the effect . . . be-
cause of patronage, luck, or endeavour, was that . . . the right men
ended up in the right jobs. (Pope, 2013, pp. 24, 29)
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Cases such as Nelson’s illustrate that patronage and performance could go
hand in hand. Next, we introduce a conceptual framework that clarifies how
and when patronage can enhance performance in our setting.
3 Conceptual framework
We use a signal extraction framework to motivate our empirical analysis. To
clarify matters, we propose a simple framework that abstracts from incentive
effects and focuses on the selection margin that admirals face when making
promotion decisions.
3.1 Setup
Each agent belongs to one of two groups, j ∈ {1, 0}; some agents are connected
to the principal (j = 1) whereas others are unconnected (j = 0). The perfor-
mance g of an agent is given by g = a+ε, which depends on the agent’s ability a
and on noise ε. The principal observes performance g and group membership j
but cannot directly observe either ability or noise. The ability of agents is dis-
tributed as a ∼ N(µj , σ2), and the noise in the measurement of performance is
distributed as ε ∼ N(0, σ2εj).
Assumption 1. The mean ability of connected agents is weakly lower than that
of unconnected agents: µ1 ≤ µ0.
This assumption reflects the more constrained nature of the pool of connected
candidates – as compared with the pool of unconnected candidates – from
which the principal can choose. The assumption also works “against” an ability
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advantage for connected agents, which makes the screening problem interest-
ing.
Assumption 2. Principals observe the performance of connected agents with
less noise: σ2ε1 < σ2ε0. Without loss of generality, we set σ2ε1 = 0.
So when assessing performance, principals are better able to distinguish luck
from ability for connected than for unconnected subordinates. This assump-
tion reflects the informational advantage of connections. The principal, whose
objective function is U = a + bj , seeks to promote higher-ability agents; the
principal may also derive a benefit bj from selecting a group-j agent. Thus
principals might exercise favoritism and derive a private benefit from select-
ing connected agents, in which case b1 > b0 ≥ 0. To simplify the presentation,
we normalize b0 = 0. We refer to this preference for connected agents as bias.
3.2 Promotion choices and performance
The principal will promote the connected agent if the expected utility from
doing so – conditional on observing a given level of performance – is higher:
E[U |g, j = 1] > E[U |g, j = 0]. The expected utility from promoting an agent
from group j with observed performance of g is
E[U |g, j] =
(
σ2
σ2 + σ2εj
g +
(
1− σ
2
σ2 + σ2εj
)
µj
)
+ bj . (1)
The conditional distribution of ability given performance is normal, with mean
equal to a weighted average of the performance and the unconditional group
mean (DeGroot, 2004).
Equation (1) captures the basic trade-off that a principal faces when mak-
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ing promotion decisions. The principal would like to promote the agent who
yields the highest (private) utility. On the one hand, the principal is better
able to identify higher-ability candidates among connected (than among un-
connected) subordinates owing to better information, as modeled using the
smaller measurement error σ2εj . On the other hand, favoritism (b1) might dis-
tort the selection. Even if an agent is known to be of low ability, a biased princi-
pal might nonetheless promote the connected agent if the private benefit from
doing so is sufficiently large. Hence the model yields two propositions that
address how family ties interact with promotion and performance. (All proofs
are given in Appendix C.)
Proposition 1: Complementarity in performance and connections. The link
between promotion and performance is stronger for those agents who are connected to
the principal: ∂E[U |g,j=1]∂g >
∂E[U |g,j=0]
∂g .
Since the performance of connected agents is observed with less noise, the
principal can more reliably attribute the observed performance to ability. Given
our extreme assumption that σ2ε1 = 0, performance is a perfect measure of the
agent’s ability. The principal will therefore be more responsive to performance
when assessing connected agents – which is the value of better information (Jia
et al., 2015).
Proposition 2: Performance and promotions. In the absence of bias, connected pro-
motees outperform unconnected promotees on average. The positive performance gap
between connected and unconnected promotees declines as bias increases. Although
connected promotees outperform unconnected promotees if bias is sufficiently small,
there is a threshold b > b¯ above which connected promotees underperform relative to
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unconnected promotees.
If there is no bias (b1 = 0), then the principal will promote the connected
agent only if the observed performance is above average, and will promote un-
connected agents only if performance is below average. The ability to pick the
highest-ability agent from the pool of connected agents reflects the value of
better information. In the presence of bias, the performance implications de-
pend on the trade-off between superior information and bias. Whereas better
information makes it easier for principals to identify talent among connected
agents, bias leads the principal to lower the promotion threshold for connected
agents.
Figure 2 illustrates these results. We first consider the case of an unbiased
principal. The figure’s dashed line plots the expected payoff from promoting
a connected agent with observed performance g; the solid, flatter line plots the
expected payoff from promoting an unconnected agent with the same perfor-
mance g. Because of better information, the relationship between performance
and promotion is steeper for connected agents (Proposition 1). The unbiased
principal will promote the connected agent whose performance exceeds the
average performance µ0 of the unconnected agent. If the connected agent’s
performance is below µ0, the principal can – owing to better information – see
that this is not a case of bad luck. In that event, the unbiased principal is better-
off promoting an unconnected agent.
In the case of bias, however, the principal will lower the performance ”bar”
for connected agents (Proposition 2). This case is seen in Figure 2 as a shift
away from the dashed line: there is now a wedge between the unbiased pro-
motion rule that selects purely on performance and the promotion rule that
also accounts for a private benefit. The area in the figure marked ”Promote
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only when biased” is the range in which connected promotions will be of lower
quality.18
4 Data and descriptive evidence
We now describe the data used in our empirical analysis, their limitations, and
the sources from which the data were derived.
4.1 Personnel and ship data
Our core data are from Threedecks,19 a Web resource that features detailed in-
formation on vessels, crews, and naval actions. Threedecks constitutes the most
comprehensive data source on the personnel and ships of the Royal Navy and
on fighting events during the Age of Sail. It has assembled information on
25,229 ships, 33,959 seamen, and 1,022 actions and battles among European
sea powers (the major ones being British, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Por-
tuguese).20 The dataset is maintained by naval enthusiasts; it is a trusted source
referenced by the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, United Kingdom.
We extract Threedecks’ complete records to construct our main dataset, re-
stricting the sample to the classic Age of Sail (1690–1849). We omit lower-tier
seamen and petty officers, confining the sample to British lieutenants, com-
manders, post-captains, and admirals (i.e., to “naval officers”). Then we com-
bine the individual-level panel of officers and positions with the ship-level
panel to construct a matched “ship–officer” dataset. The resulting ship-level
18Such definitely promotions occurred: ”no obviously stupid captain was appointed. But occa-
sionally an officer who was a competent seaman but had defects in his character which should have
barred him did in fact obtain command because of influence: he or a relative... knew an admiral or
minister.” (Pope, 2013, p. 54).
19http://www.threedecks.org
20We downloaded the data in September 2018; the numbers are correct as of that date.
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panel contains rich data on outcomes such as the number of actions under-
taken, the number of enemy ships captured or destroyed, and whether the ship
itself was captured, wrecked, or sunk.
We conduct a series of validation exercises to assess the coverage and qual-
ity of the data. To evaluate the coverage, we compare the number of rated ships
included in our data to the complete record of all rated ships (Colledge and
Warlow, 2010). This comparison yields a coverage rate of 95%. To assess the
data quality, we randomly sampled 1% of the officers and checked their careers
against standard references (Clowes et al., 1897; Syrett and DiNardo, 1994).
Our final dataset contains information on 3,904 ships and on the careers of
5,848 officers over a period of 160 years, a total 82,958 officer-ship-year obser-
vations. Figure A1 (in Appendix B) plots the variation over time. It should
come as no surprise that fighting events cluster during wartime, when there is
a spike also in our dataset’s number of officers. At the peak, we can reference
500 fighting events per year and connect them to 1,500 officers. Table 1 shows
the summary statistics for the main sample at the officer level. An officer re-
mains in the Royal Navy for an average of 12.5 years and commands a ship for
about 6.4 years. The average officer serves on 3.5 different ships with an average
of 32 guns. Naval officers in our dataset spend only 18% of their entire service
span on large battle ships, the ships of the line. On average, each officer can
claim one enemy capture, while only 14% of the officers ever lose a ship to the
enemy. The likelihood of other performance-related events (e.g., the number of
actions seen or ships destroyed) is lower. Finally, half of all officers make it to
post-captain and higher, although few (only 3%) ever become admirals.
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4.2 Measuring family ties
Our analysis focuses on connections to the two top admirals – the First Lord of
the Admiralty and the Admiral of the Fleet. These two officers were central to
all personnel decisions: who was allowed to command which vessel and who
was put on half-pay, whether an officer would serve in a distant and disease-
ridden station or near home, and whether a captain’s junior officers would
themselves receive promotions. In home waters, all appointments were made
directly by the Admiralty; its control of overseas promotions and appointments
increased with time (Rodger, 2005).
We use genealogical data from the Peerage dataset21 to check for whether
officers were connected to the Admiralty. This dataset contains family tree data
for the peerage of Britain as well as the royal families of Europe, including ge-
nealogical data on the British elite and military. We link officers in our dataset
to the Peerage data by matching based on full name, title, year of birth, and
year of death. For 11% of officers, the geneological data can be used to mea-
sure family distance to the Admiralty. Given the data’s antiquity and that many
officers rose from the middling classes (and thus are not included in the elite
dataset), we consider this to be a reasonable match rate.22 Because the family
trees of nearly all admirals are mapped out, we can safely assume that the re-
maining officers are unconnected to their superior. Since our empirical strategy
exploits within-officer variation in connectedness, this assumption does not in-
troduce selectivity issues – if anything, it is likely to bias our estimates toward
zero and thus to yield more conservative results. For the subset of matched
officers, we compute the shortest distance in pre-determined family ties.23 We
21http://www.thepeerage.com
22In comparison, Xu (2018) obtains a match rate of 34% for governors of the British Empire 1854–
1966, who are recruited from a much more elite population.
23Pre-determined family ties capture direct blood relatedness through links with earlier genera-
tions. These ties exclude marriages, which form network links endogenously.
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then consider an admiral and an officer to have shared ancestry (family ties) if
the degree of separation is sufficiently close.24
There is a trade-off in choosing a cut-off that defines “closeness”. Although
a low degree of separation increases the likelihood of an actual social tie, a
low cut-off reduces the number of admirals and officers who are classified as
kin. Since the empirical strategy exploits observing the same officers under
changing connectedness to the Admiralty, it follows that a lower degree will
reduce the number of switchers. We thus consider a naval officer to be connected
when he is separated by no more than 16 degrees from either of the two leading
admirals. This definition, which follows the one given by Xu (2018), captures
the extent to which two individuals have a shared ancestry. The cut-off value
is “generous”, but it is in line with the enormous weight that contemporaries
placed on pedigree and social connections – as evidenced by the numerous
publications listing the family trees of noblemen and -women.
Figure A2 illustrates the variation in the share of naval officers who were
connected, according to this measure, between 1690 and 1849. Although only
a few officers were linked to the top of the naval administration in the first
decades of the 18th century, their share increased over time. During the Revo-
lutionary Wars against France, that share peaked at more than 20% of the total.
It then fell sharply after a highly successful career admiral from a middling
background, John Jervis (Earl of St. Vincent), became First Lord of the Admi-
ralty and decided to curtail the role of “influence” in naval appointments.
Out of the 5,848 officers in our dataset, 562 were at some point of their
career connected through family ties to the Lord Admiral or the Admiral of
the Fleet. Because the particular individuals who hold those positions come
and go, we observe variation over time in connectedness to the very top of the
24The results are robust to cut-offs of between 14 and 20 degrees of separation.
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Navy hierarchy. Among the 562 officers who were ever connected, 196 are con-
nected throughout their career (always connected). For the 366 who experience
a switch in their ties to the Admiralty, the average “switcher” enjoyed ties to
the Admiralty for 60% of his time on active service.
4.3 Battle-level outcomes
Finally, we make use of the rich documentation of naval engagements to con-
struct battle-level outcomes. These range from famous single-ship actions (e.g.,
HMS Java versus USS Constitution in 1812) to full-scale fleet actions like the Bat-
tle of Trafalgar, which involved 74 battle ships. These naval engagements have
been carefully documented by the Royal Navy and subsequent historians.
We focus on two types of engagements, of which the first comprises fleet
and flotilla actions. These actions involve multiple ships on both sides. We use
Threedecks to identify, for our study period of 1690–1849, 94 fleet actions and
263 flotilla actions with a total of 972 British ships involved. The second type of
engagement is single-ship actions. These are “chance” engagements between
two opposing ships, often of relatively equal size. We were able to identify 172
single-ship actions.
For each of these actions, we conduct careful qualitative research by draw-
ing on historical accounts (such as those provided by Clowes for the years 1794–
1803) and descriptions from the London Gazette. This approach allows us to
code officer-ship-action–level information on whether a given officer captured
an enemy ship, retreated, or saw his own ship captured. We link the officers
and ships involved to our main dataset and thereby obtain the gun count of
ships, battle outcomes, as well as performance-related characteristics such as
experience.
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5 Promotion, performance and family ties
5.1 Promotions and performance
We now test Proposition 1. Figure 3 offers an empirical counterpart to the the-
oretical prediction shown in Figure 2. More specifically, it plots the share of
commanders who are promoted to post-captain, at different levels of cumula-
tive performance, as a function of connectedness to the Admiralty. The share
promoted is increasing in performance, which is in line with merit-based pro-
motions to post-captain. Those who capture more enemy ships, see more ac-
tion, and/or destroy more enemy structures are more likely to be “made post”.
There is some evidence of favoritism in the sense that Admiralty-connected
commanders are more likely to be promoted at every level of performance. At
the same time, and crucially, the positive relationship between promotion and
performance is stronger for officers who are connected to the Admiralty; in
other words, admirals are promoting even more by merit when their subordi-
nate is a kin.
In order to move beyond the bivariate correlation, we estimate a regression
model as the empirical counterpart to (1). Thus, for officer i in year t, we esti-
mate
yit = αqit + βcit + γqit × cit + θi + τt + εit; (2)
in this expression, yit = 1 only if officer i was promoted to post-captain in
year t (otherwise, yit = 0). The variable qit is the performance measure. In
this context, we measure performance as the cumulative number of captures,
actions seen, and ships destroyed. To ensure that this measure of performance
is pre-determined and not driven by the contemporaneous allocation choices
of admirals, we measure cumulative performance up to the previous year. The
indicator variable cit is set to 1 if officer i has family ties to the Admiralty in
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year t (and is set to 0 otherwise). We use θi and τt to denote (respectively) officer
and year fixed effects; εit is the error term, which we cluster at the officer level.
The interaction between performance and connectedness is the key identi-
fying variation that we exploit. Throughout their careers, officers experience
changes in the extent to which they are connected to the Admiralty. As admi-
rals turned over at the top because of retirement, illnes and death, some officers
gained connections while others lost them. This dynamic allows us to compare
the promotion chances of the same officers who differ not only in their perfor-
mance during various years but also in their connectedness to the Admiralty.
If performance and connections are indeed complements, then for the inter-
action of interest we should expect γ > 0. Since promotion to post-captain is
irreversible, we restrict the sample to officers who can still be promoted.
The results are presented in Table 2 and confirm the complementarity be-
tween performance and connections in determining promotion decisions. All
regressions include year fixed effects. In column [1], we first report the levels
using cohort fixed effects before moving to the final specification. Promotions
to post-captain are based on performance, but connections are also important.
One additional fighting event is associated with a 5.5 percentage-point (p.p.)
increase in the probability of promotion. Officers with family ties to the Admi-
ralty are 8.9 p.p. more likely to make post than officers who are unconnected.
Compared to the unconditional promotion probability of 10.8 p.p. these mag-
nitudes are economically meaningful.
In column [2], we include the interaction between performance and connec-
tions. In line with the visual evidence in Figure 3, we find that performance
and connections are complements for promotions to post-captain. Although
there is an overall positive relationship between promotion and performance,
the association is stronger for those who are connected to the Admiralty. This
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outcome is consistent with the interpretation that admirals have better infor-
mation (Section 3). Finally, column [3] reports results from the preferred spec-
ification when using officer fixed effects. Since officer fixed effects absorb any
time-invariant cross-officer differences in promotion, performance, and con-
nectedness we are now holding the selection margin constant. The identifying
variation in performance thus stems from the very same officer exhibiting dif-
ferential performance over time; similarly, variation in connectedness is now
driven by turnover at the highest echelon of the Admiralty. Once the selection
margin is held constant, the main effect of connectedness weakens consider-
ably and becomes statistically insignificant. This result suggests the presence
of officer-specific unobserved correlates of connectedness that also affect pro-
motion decisions – as would be the case if, for example, connected individuals
were of systematically higher quality. Yet because the coefficient for perfor-
mance increases as controls are added, we can be confident that unobservables
are unlikely to be driving the relationship. What is critical for an empirical test
is our finding that the interaction between performance and connections re-
mains positive and statistically significant.
Finally, we address concerns that the results are driven by connected of-
ficers being allocated better ships, and being ”on the beach” less often. We
adopt two strategies for that purpose. First, we restrict the sample to officers
who are commanding ships (column [4] in Table 2). Second, conditional on
commanding a ship, we exploit the same ship being observed under different
officers – which allows us to introduce ship fixed effects as a means of absorb-
ing time-invariant ship-specific unobservables (column [5]). As columns [4]
and [5] show, the sample restriction and inclusion of ship fixed effects leave
the estimates of interest nearly unchanged. Therefore, performance and con-
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nections served as complements in determining whom to promote.25
5.2 Post-promotion performance
Are connected promotees actually more effective after the essential promo-
tion to post-captain? It is unclear whether these officers will outperform as
post-captains (Proposition 2) – especially when one considers that, if admi-
rals are biased in favor of their kin, then connections will substitute for ability
and thus lead to lower-quality officers being promoted. Conversely, if admi-
rals screen on unobservable characteristics that predict greater performance,
then we should expect connected promotees to outperform even their high-
achieving but unconnected peers.
To address this question empirically, we conduct an event study that ex-
amines the performance difference between connected and unconnected pro-
motees as regards promotion to post-captain. We create a balanced panel of
promoted officers for whom we have data in the five-year window around the
year of making post. This approach ensures that our results are not driven by
changes over time in the composition of the officer pool. Our analysis is based
on a balanced panel of 638 officers, of whom 16% are connected promotees.
Figure 4 offers visual evidence concerning the performance of post-captains
around their promotion window. The figure contrasts connected promotees
with those who were unconnected to the Admiralty in the year of their promo-
tion. Prior to promotion, the connected perform somewhat less well; this ob-
servation is in line with the results plotted in Figure 3, which suggests that the
bar for promotion of connected officers was actually lower than that for uncon-
25Because promotion to post-captain is an absorbing state, we can also use survival analysis.
Thus we estimate Cox proportional hazard models and show that the marginal effect (on promotion
prospects) of being connnected rises with performance – just as in the ordinary least-squares setup.
The results are reported in Appendix D.
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nected ones. So even though there are no large and significant differences be-
tween connected and unconnected officers prior to annual performance–based
promotion, the performance gap after making post is both large and persistent.
Next, we estimate, for officer i in the year around promotion t,
qit = βCi × post t + θi + τt + εit; (3)
here qit measures the cumulative performance of officer i in the year around
the promotion window t = {−5,−4, ..., 4, 5}. The indicator Ci is set equal to 1
if the officer was connected to the Admiralty in the year of making post and
is otherwise set to 0; post t is a dummy set to 1 only for officers who have been
promoted to a “post ship” (post t = 1[t ≥ 0]). In this DiD setting, the coefficient
of interest β measures the difference in performance between connected and
unconnected promotees after both were promoted to post-captain, captured
by the interaction Ci × post t. In Equation (3), the τt are dummies for each year
around the promotion window and the θi are officer fixed effects. As before,
standard errors are clustered at the officer level.
The results are shown in Panel A of Table 3. There is no statistically signif-
icant difference between connected and unconnected promotees in the years
prior to their promotion to post-captain. After that promotion, however, those
promoted while connected to the Admiralty consistently outperform (column
[1]). In column [2] we add officer fixed effects, which “partial out” time-invari-
ant, individual-specific differences that may be correlated with connectedness –
for instance, that connected officers tend to come from more elite families. The
identifying variation thus results from officers who experience a switch in their
connectedness to the Admiralty around the promotion window. Despite this
substantially more restrictive specification, the pattern remains robust.
Since those who are connected to a superior often remain connected for a
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while, an important question concerns whether the observed effects are driven
by the selection made at the time of promotion or whether they are instead driven
by contemporaneous connections to the Admiralty. The answer to this ques-
tion has implications for interpreting the results. If the results are driven by
contemporaneous connections, then it will be much harder to rule out that ad-
mirals are providing connected promotees with better inputs throughout – for
example, by allocating them crews that are more skilled or assigning them to
more promising theaters of war. So in column [3] of Table 3, we control for
contemporaneous connectedness to the Admiralty. It is interesting that the ef-
fect of connected promotions persists, suggesting that it is the past promotion
decision of the previously connected admiral that does, indeed, drive the ef-
fect. To corroborate this conclusion, column [4] restricts the sample to officers
whose promoting admiral rotates out following the promotion. In line with
the notion of better screening, connected promotees continue to outperform
even if their patron is no longer in office. Finally, the results continue to hold
when different control groups are used. In column [5], we confine the com-
parison to the subset of officers who experience switches in family ties to the
top of the Navy during their career. Although officers who are connected to
the Admiralty throughout may differ substantially from those who were never
connected, the subset of those who experience changes in connections is likely
to be more comparable to the former group. The results are largely unaffected.
Role of assignment. Following promotion to post, the better performance
of connected versus unconnected promotees could operate through one or more
of three channels. First, connected promotees may have been given command
more often (reducing time “on the beach”). Second, they might have received
better ships and crews and thus more opportunities to distinguish themselves.
Third, officers could actually perform better for any given assignment, ship,
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and crew. To investigate these three channels, in column [1] of Table 3’s Panel B
we repeat the event study of Panel A while using a dummy set to 1 if the focal
officer is given command over a ship in a given year. As can be seen by the val-
ues reported in that column, connected promotees enjoy a 12.6% point greater
likelihood of actually commanding a ship after promotion to post-captain. In
addition, connected promotees appear to outperform whenever they do com-
mand a ship. In columns [2]–[5] of Panel B, we repeat the performance event
study but while restricting the analysis to those officers who were given a ship
(and thus had a chance to perform). Conditional on commanding a ship, con-
nected promotees still outperform unconnected promotees following promo-
tion to post.
To test whether the performance gap is driven by the preferential alloca-
tion of better ships to connected officers, we include ship fixed effects. As col-
umn [3] shows, partialing out cross-ship differences in performance does not
explain the performance gap. In column [4], we also include controls for the
ship’s age as well as an indicator set equal to 1 for ships that were refitted in a
given year. Once again, the point estimates remain comparable. Finally, we as-
sess whether the performance gap can be explained by better crews. The naval
records contain information about when crews were paid off, which enables
us to reconstruct crew turnover for each ship and to identify the years under
which a ship is staffed by the same crew. Once again, the inclusion of ship-
specific crew fixed effects leaves the point estimates nearly unchanged (col-
umn [5]).
We conduct a range of additional robustness exercises. First, we check for
whether the performance results differ when the sample is restricted to those
who ever commanded a ship; it is reassuring that the results are comparable
(see Appendix Table A1). Second, we conduct a bounding exercise and thereby
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assess the extent to which selective half-pay could account for our results. More
specifically, we impute varying counterfactual performances to those who are
on half-pay. As Appendix Table A2 shows, our results remain robust and – if
anything – become stronger.
Incentives and loyalty. A remaining concern might be that our results do
not solely reflect selection through better promotion decisions. In addition,
connected promotees could well be more motivated to exert effort when pro-
gressing toward flag positions (i.e. to become admirals). Promotees may also
feel that some reciprocation toward their patrons is in order – for instance, by
exerting greater effort (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Similarly, if connected pro-
motees are more likely to hail from naval families then reputational concerns
might likewise induce greater effort. In all these cases, the results may reflect
a combination of selection and incentive effects.
Because promotions among post-captains are mainly determined by senior-
ity, there is little room to increase one’s chances through greater effort; these
circumstances should alleviate any concerns about strong incentive responses.
To demonstrate this claim empirically, we repeat the promotion regressions
(Table 2) for the sample of post-captains to predict progression toward admi-
ral positions (Appendix Table A3). As expected in light of the seniority-based
setup, neither battle performance nor connections predict promotions to admi-
ral. To assess the role of reputational concerns (e.g. family honor), we test for
whether the effect is driven by members of naval families – that is, by those who
are sons and nephews of naval officers (who are themselves more likely con-
nected to the top of the naval hierarchy). Whereas officers with close relatives
in the navy do better on average, connected officers with a father in the navy
exhibit no additional superiority; it is worth noting that our results remain
largely unchanged even after controlling for this factor (Appendix Table A4).
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Reciprocity may play a role, but it should not be a large one after the promoting
admiral has stepped down – and our results still hold (see column [5] of Table 4
in Section 6.1). Taken together, these results consistently show that connected
promotees (on average) outperform unconnected promotees and that selection
is a most likely factor in explaining that difference.
6 Mechanisms
What is driving the large performance gap between connected and uncon-
nected naval officers? It could be that connected officers were given more at-
tractive assignments – positions that facilitated distinguishing themselves in
battle, say, or easy cruises with ample opportunities for capturing prizes. To
circumvent these issues – and to examine the determinants of fighting perfor-
mance beyond the ease of assignment – we first distinguish between two types
of naval actions: fleet actions and single-ship encounters. In fleet actions, fa-
vored officers may be included in a squadron about to bring the enemy to ac-
tion or be given a more prominent position in the line of battle; these factors,
for which we can control, enable such officers to “score” more easily. Yet in
single-ship actions, chance encounters on the high seas determine who fights
whom. In this type of engagement, we can readily measure (after controlling
for the quality of ships) the combined effect of seamanship, gunnery, and lead-
ership. We find that ships commanded by connected appointees outfight those
of their unconnected peers in both types of engagements.
Next we examine the source of this performance gap. Are admirals who
in general promote more on merit also those who favor only talented relatives,
who then go on to earn more laurels? And are admirals who favor their kin
in general also poor at picking good officers when it comes to promotions?
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We estimate indicators of admirals’ “style” and show that they have predictive
power regarding the performance of connected appointees.
6.1 Fleet actions
We have information on 1,959 British officers who fought in fleet and flotilla
actions. On average, they were outgunned – they fought with less than two
thirds of the enemies’ numbers of ships and guns. In almost 14% of actions, an
officer’s ship captured an enemy ship; in 2%, they lost their own. Connected
promotees constitute 21% of our sample (Table A5).
We examine the determinants of performance by referring to Table 4, in
which Panel A summarizes captures of the enemy. Column [1] of that panel
shows that connected promotees are 8 p.p. more likely to capture an enemy
ship than are unconnected promotees – a sizeable increase over the 13.9% base
rate of such capture. This effect is unchanged when we control (in column [2])
for promotion-year fixed effects and post-captain experience. In column [3] we
introduce fixed effects for the position of ships, thereby controlling for whether
a ship is at the vanguard, center, or rear of the battle formation. Column [4]
controls for the relative size and strength of fleets. Although a British fleet
with more vessels made it harder for any individual officer to score, the fleet’s
having more guns certainly helped. In column [5], we repeat the exercise but
for British losses. The main result here is the opposite of that for British captures:
a connected promotee is much less likely than an unconnected one to lose his
ship to the enemy. The effect is substantial, as the former’s average rate of losses
was less than half that of the latter’s.
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6.2 Single-ship actions
The British Navy dominated in single-ship actions. Among 172 such encoun-
ters, British officers captured or sank 115 enemy ships, lost only 16 ships, and
engaged in 41 inconclusive skirmishes (from which the enemy withdrew 32
times). The British public viewed defeat in single-ship action as being espe-
cially shameful (Lambert, 2013). The most salient aspect of single-ship actions
is that they are usually random encounters on the high seas. Moreover, the
enemy ship’s size (as measured by number of guns or crew members) in such
encounters is remarkably comparable (Appendix Table A6) – even though con-
nected promotees typically commanded somewhat larger ships.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results for single-ship actions. Column [1]
gives a simple comparison of the winning rate between connected and uncon-
nected promotees. A single-ship action is deemed won if the enemy ship was
either captured or sunk. Connected promotees are significantly more likely
to win: they are 20 p.p. more likely (on average) to win a single-ship engage-
ment (column [1]). Compared with the mean of the dependent variable, this
difference amounts to a 31% increase. To ensure that the higher capture rate is
not driven by more favorable terms of engagement, column [2] controls for the
gun ratio (i.e., the ratio of own to enemy guns). Even though ships with a more
powerful broadside were more likely to win, controlling for gun ratios leaves
the gap in winning rate nearly unaffected.
Finally, column [3] controls also for the year of promotion to post-captain
and for experience; recall from Section 1 that the latter was, according to Ben-
jamin and Tifrea (2007), one of the Royal Navy’s competitive advantages. As
before, the point estimate remains almost constant. Officers promoted while
connected to the Admiralty thus had a significantly higher success rate, in
single-ship encounters, than did unconnected promotees. Although connected
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promotees were no less likely to lose an engagement, their overall higher suc-
cess rate is driven by a smaller number of inconclusive engagements: in essence,
connected officers either lost or won and never experienced a draw; whereas
nearly a fourth of all unconnected officers fought indecisive engagements. In
single-ship encounters, then, a major determinant of the superior performance
by connected promotees was “fighting spirit” – willingness to fight until vic-
tory was won, and the determination to pursue an enemy that was trying to
break off the engagement.
6.3 The role of Admiralty styles
We have shown that connected promotees outperform unconnected promotees
as post-captains, but this average result may mask considerable heterogeneity.
A large literature on management styles (see e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2003;
Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) suggests that the selection effect may vary with
the Admiralty’s governance “style”.26.
Seen through the lens of our model, differences in governance styles will
reflect Admiralty-specific variation in two parameters: admirals’ propensity to
promote based on merit because of differences in their ability to observe per-
formance (σ2εj); and the extent to which admirals exercise favoritism to bias the
allocation of positions toward their kin (b1).
We apply these predictions to the data by exploiting our observation of
post-captain promotions under different Admiralties over time. We use each
combination of Head of the Admiralty and Admiral of the Fleet as a separate
26In addition to wanting to favor one’s own kin, other factors may have led to less than ideal
appointments. There is anecdotal evidence that, for example, all Admiralties were under constant
pressure to promote the sons of the high nobility and of well-connected politicians – and that ad-
mirals were not all equally able to withstand such pressures (Rodger, 2005, pp. 512–15). Naval
historians have also emphasized that the possible benefits of patronage depended on whether the
top of the hierarchy “used a system of patronage to identify and advance men of ability” (Rodger,
1986, p. 275)
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observation, which yields 49 different combinations of top naval administra-
tors.
First, we assess the level of meritocracy in these “management teams” by
estimating α and β from Equation (2) for each Admiralty. Panel A of Figure 5
shows that, for certain Admiralty teams, performance had little effect on pro-
motion chances – and that, with a few management teams, there is actually a
negative association between performance and promotion. Yet for most admi-
ral combinations, the effect of merit was strictly positive.
Second, we estimate the extent of family bias for each Admiralty. Panel B in
Figure 5 reports our estimated connection premia for the different Admiralty
periods. This figure reveals that few admirals discriminated against relatives
and that some mild favoritism was the norm: coefficients are almost all positive
but are mostly small and not statistically significant.
Figure 6 plots our measures of biased and merit-based promotions over
time. Positive bias in promotions was mostly a phenomenon of the 19th cen-
tury, whereas merit-based promotions predominated in the 1720s and 1740s.
The two measures are inversely correlated:27 Admiralty teams that showed fa-
voritism gave lower weight to merit in promotions, which supports (at least
indirectly) our claim to be measuring “style”.
Table 5 uses the estimated coefficients for merit and bias to explain the per-
formance of post-captains. We now bootstrap the standard errors to account for
the estimation’s two-stage nature. Column [1] repeats our baseline estimate
of the differential performance of connected officers around their promotion
to post-captain. In column [2], we show that officers promoted by Admiralty
teams that prioritized merit picked (connected) subordinates who proved to be
more successful. Column [3] indicates that the opposite also holds: more bias
27The correlation is both negative and statistically significant (Appendix Table A7).
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in promotion decisions resulted in worse performance. There was conspicu-
ous underperformance by connected promotees who owed their appointment
to Admiralties that favored relatives (i.e., irrespective of merit). Finally, we
corroborate these findings using an alternative shifter of management style –
namely, war. War years are periods during which the Admiralty’s incentive to
select the highest-performing officers is arguably greater.28 We do indeed find
that officers promoted during periods of war performed better, especially those
who were connected to the Admiralty.
These results suggest that the greater performance of relatives in the Royal
Navy varied with the management style of top naval bureaucrats. Leading
admirals who promoted officers in a meritocratic fashion boosted in particu-
lar the careers of talented relatives, who went on to outfight other comparable
officers. Yet when the leading naval staff practiced nepotism by rewarding rela-
tives with plum assignments, overall performance suffered because connected
appointees were not up to the task. Thus the net effect of patronage hinged
on the probity and judgment of the decision makers at the top of the naval
hierarchy.
7 Conclusion
Winston Churchill famously argued that the Royal Navy ran on “rum, sodomy,
and the lash.” In its heyday, it was also a nepotistic institution, where personal
connections could make a huge difference to promotion prospects. How do we
square this with the Royal Navy’s outstanding fighting record? One interpre-
tation is that it excelled despite its shortcomings – and perhaps thanks also to
the even greater weaknesses of its adversaries.
28The link between performance and promotion is even steeper for connected officers during pe-
riods of war, but this outcome may also reflect better information (Appendix Table A8).
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An alternative interpretation is that the Navy succeeded because of patron-
age. That patronage can have positive effects has long been argued in economic
theory, but there was no hard evidence to suggest that it offered tangible ben-
efits. Using individual-level data on officers’ fighting records during the 18th
century, we start by establishing that connected promotees outperformed (on
average) unconnected ones.
Two factors might explain this result. First, connected officers could expect
greater rewards for performance; for example, an officer’s accomplishments are
noticed more readily if he has an uncle at the head of the Admiralty. Second,
admirals might simply know their relatives better than nonrelatives, which al-
lows for factoring in intangible factors that predict future officer effectiveness.
We establish that merit paid, on average, for both the connected and uncon-
nected – but that it yielded greater rewards for those with family ties to top
admirals. This empirical pattern is consistent with connected admirals having
better information.
Performance subsequent to promotion reveals that connected officers tended
to make better fighting captains. Promoted officers were given not only larger
ships but also more autonomy in their command. We find that connected offi-
cers outperformed unconnected ones by a large margin once they were awarded
independent command, although connected and unconnected officers performed
similarly prior to that time. Selection was thus a paramount factor underlying
the effectiveness of patronage in the 18th century Royal Navy. To reinforce this
point, we show that admirals whose promotion decisions were usually based
on merit were also better at picking relatives who subsequently performed
well.
These findings have broader implications because they emphasize the im-
portance of selection. In an institutional environment where promotions are
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discretionary, how discretion is used is critical. If “good” principals use their
discretion to promote the highest-performing subordinates, then propitious
patronage will prevail. In contrast, “bad” principals will beget nepotism by
promoting subordinates who, once they rise to the rank of admiral, are more
likely to abuse patronage. Of course, these results do not suggest that patron-
age itself is always beneficial for organizational performance. However, they
do show that personal ties might help resolve information asymmetries in en-
vironments where true talent is difficult to observe. As such, patronage can
serve as a second-best solution to the problem of identifying talent.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of naval officers
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Mean SD IQR Obs.
Years of service 12.54 13.25 15 5,848
Total years commanding ship 6.39 5.06 7 5,848
Number of ships commanded 3.46 3.24 4 5,848
Ship of the line 0.186 0.27 0.33 5,848
Guns 32.31 20.46 33.66 5,808
Enemy ships captured 1.04 2.23 1 5,848
No. of flotilla/fleet actions 0.50 1.17 0 5,848
Enemy ships sunk 0.02 0.18 0 5,848
Own ships lost 0.14 0.37 0 5,848
Made post 0.47 0.49 1 5,848
Made admiral 0.03 0.17 0 5,848
Notes: The unit of observation is the naval officer (i.e., all lieutenants, commanders, post-
captains, and admirals). The sample includes all the naval officers who served during our study
period of 1690–1849. We report the mean (column [1]), standard deviation (column [2]), in-
terquartile range (column [3]), the total number of officers (column [4]). A ”ship of the line” is
a large naval warship.
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Table 2: Promotion to post-captain, battle performance and connectedness
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Promoted to post-captain=1
Mean of dependent variable 0.108 0.108 0.099 0.167 0.156
Battle performance 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.090*** 0.074*** 0.075***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Connected 0.089*** 0.072*** 0.021 0.011 -0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.057) (0.057)
Battle performance × Connected 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.089*** 0.076***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Entry-year FEs Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y
Ship FEs Y
Observations 38,932 38,932 38,179 20,407 19,958
Notes: The unit of observation is the officer-year. This table reports how promotion to post-
captain is related to battle performance, connectedness and their interaction. Battle performance
is measured as the cumulative number of actions, enemy units destroyed, and captures up to
the previous year; connected is a dummy variable set to 1 if the officer shares family ties to the
Admiralty (and set to 0 otherwise). The sample includes all officers between 1690 and 1849. In
columns [4]- [5], the sample is conditioned on officers who are allocated a ship. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the officer-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Battle performance around promotion to post-captain
Panel A [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Battle performance
Mean of dependent variable 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.828 0.894
Connected promotee -0.142
(0.103)
Connected promotee × Post 0.596*** 0.516** 0.516** 0.541** 0.606*
(0.207) (0.201) (0.201) (0.216) (0.316)
Connected 0.225 0.256 0.247
(0.187) (0.189) (0.188)
Year around promotion FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Promotion-year FEs Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y Y
Sample Full sample Rotate out Switcher
Observations 8,403 8,403 8,403 7,720 1,601
Panel B [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Command Battle performance
Mean of dependent variable 0.588 1.099 1.092 1.092 1.075
Connected promotee × Post 0.126** 0.399* 0.370** 0.367** 0.323*
(0.050) (0.221) (0.185) (0.184) (0.195)
Year around promotion FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Ship FEs Y Y Y
Ship-year controls Y Y
Ship-crew FEs Y
Sample Full Commanding ship
Observations 8,403 4,928 4,695 4,695 4,448
Notes: The unit of observation is the officer-year. This table reports how performance is related
to connectedness in the year of promotion to post-captain during a five-year window around
that promotion. Battle performance is measured as the cumulative number of actions, enemy
units destroyed, and captures up to the previous year. Connected promotee is a dummy set to 1 if
the officer has family ties with the Admiralty in the year of his promotion to post-captain (and
is otherwise set to 0). Post is a dummy set to 1 in the year and the after a officer was promoted to
post-captain. The balanced sample includes all post-captains in a five-year promotion window
around the year they made post. In Panel A, column [4] is based on the subset of officers whose
promoting admirals rotated out by the fifth year after promotion; the column [5] sample is the
subset of officers (the ”switchers”) who ever experienced a change in their connections to the
Admiralty. In Panel B, the sample for columns [2]–[4] is the subset of officers who commanded
a ship. Ship-year controls are the vessel’s age, and a dummy set to 1 if the ship was repaired
in the year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the officer level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Battle-level performance and connected promotions
Panel A: Fleet and flotilla actions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Captured enemy ship Lost
Mean of dependent variable 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.0207
Connected promotee 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.078*** -0.015**
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.007)
Ratio ships British fleet/enemy fleet -0.592*** -0.103
(0.171) (0.109)
Ratio guns British fleet/enemy fleet 0.314* 0.083
(0.161) (0.108)
Battle-type FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Promotion-year FEs Y Y Y Y
Years-since-promotion FEs Y Y Y Y
Order-of-battle FEs Y Y Y
Observations 1,959 1,936 1,936 1,936 1,936
Panel B: Single-ship actions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Wins single-ship action Loss Draw
Mean of dependent variable 0.669 0.669 0.663 0.0964 0.241
Connected promotee 0.200*** 0.231*** 0.226*** -0.008 -0.218***
(0.071) (0.075) (0.075) (0.055) (0.062)
Ratio guns British ship/enemy ship 0.167*** -0.072*** -0.095*
(0.056) (0.022) (0.049)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 172 172 166 166 166
Notes: This table reports how the performance of post-captains in fleet, flotilla, and single-ship
actions is related to an officer’s connection to the Admiralty when promoted to post-captain. In
Panel A, the unit of observation is the officer-ship-battle. In columns [1]–[4], the dependent
variable is a dummy set equal to 1 if the officer successfully captured an enemy ship (and set to
0 otherwise). In column [5], the dependent variable is a dummy set to 1 if the officer’s ship was
captured or sunk by the enemy. Battle-type FEs distinguish between flotilla and fleet actions.
Order-of-battle FEs involve the ship’s position in the line (i.e., either vanguard, centre and rear).
Ratio ships British fleet/enemy fleet is equal to the total number of British ships divided by the
total number of enemy ships that were involved in the fleet or flotilla action; Ratio guns British
fleet/enemy fleet is the total number of guns across all British ships divided by the total number
of guns across all enemy ships involved in the fleet or flotilla action. In Panel B, the unit of
observation is the single-ship action. Winning is defined as either capturing or sinking an enemy
ship; losing is defined as being either captured or sunk by the enemy; inconclusive engagements
are viewed as a draw. Ratio guns British ship/enemy ship is equal to the own number of guns
divided by the enemy number of guns. Controls include the year of promotion to post-captain
and the number of years since that promotion. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the officer. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Battle performance of connected promotees by Admiralty style
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Battle performance
Mean of dependent variable 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
Connected promotee × Post 0.516** 0.554*** 0.548*** 0.496***
(0.201) [0.087] [0.082] (0.181)
Merit × Post -0.039
[0.062]
Connected promotee ×Merit × Post 0.337***
[0.163]
Biased promotion × Post 0.002
[0.065]
Connected promotee × Biased promotion × Post -0.350***
[0.106]
War × Post 0.501***
(0.045)
Connected promotee ×War × Post 0.319**
(0.125)
Year around promotion FEs Y Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,403 8,403 8,403 8,403
Notes: This table reports how battle performance for connected promotees is related to Admi-
ralty style. Battle performance is measured as the cumulative number of actions, enemy units
destroyed and captures up to the previous year. Post is a dummy set to 1 after the officer was
made post (and set to 0 otherwise). Connected promotee is a dummy set to 1 for officers who
were promoted to post-captain while being connected to the Admiralty. Merit is the elasticity
of performance with respect to promotions by the promoting Admiralty (see Table 2), normal-
ized to a mean 0 and a SD of 1. Biased promotion is the gap between connected and unconected
officers in promotion rates to post-captain by the promoting Admiralty, normalized to a mean
0 and a SD of 1. War is a dummy that is set to 1 for the promoting Admiralties that served dur-
ing a period of war. The balanced sample includes all post-captains in a five-year promotion
window around the year they made post. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
officer level; standard errors in columns [2]–[3] are bootstrapped (1,000 repetitions, with values
reported in brackets). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figures
Figure 1: Size and fighting power of the Royal Navy, 1690-1849
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Notes: This figure plots the number of British Royal Navy ships and total number of guns over time.
Figure 2: Selection of officers and performance
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Figure 3: Merit-based promotion to post-captain by ties to Admiralty
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Notes: This figure presents a binscatter of the relationship between the share of commanders pro-
moted to post-captain and their cumulative performance, broken down by connectedness to Admi-
ralty.
Figure 4: Battle performance around promotion window by connectedness
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Notes: This figure shows the battle performance of connected and unconnected officers during a five-
year window around the year of their respective promotions to post-captain. Time of treatment is
year=0, which is when captains are promoted.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity in merit promotions and bias by Admiralty
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Notes: This figure depicts the elasticities between battle performance and promotion (Panel A), as
well as the average promotion gap between connected and unconnected officers (Panel B), estimated
for each Admiralty (i.e. for each Lord Admiralty–Admiral of the Fleet pair).
Figure 6: Merit promotions and bias by Admiralties over time
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Notes: This figure plots variation in the degree of merit and bias in promotions (both standardized)
over time.
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A Appendix Tables
Table A1: Dropping those who never commanded pre-promotion
[1] [2] [3]
Battle performance
Mean dependent variable 0.832 0.914 0.521
Connected promotee × Post 0.516** 0.553** 0.396
(0.201) (0.243) (0.279)
Year-around-promotion FEs Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y
Sample All Commanded Never
Observations 8,403 6,655 1,748
Notes: The unit of analysis is the officer-year. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the officer level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A2: Counterfactual performance of non-commanding officers
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Battle performance
Mean dependent variable 0.832 1.450 6.724 9.732
Connected promotee × Post 0.516** 0.595*** 1.059*** 1.323**
(0.201) (0.205) (0.381) (0.529)
Year-around-promotion FEs Y Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y Y
Imputed performance Median Mean Top 5% Top 1%
for non-commanding 0 0.246 2 3
Observations 8,403 8,403 8,403 8,403
Notes: The unit of analysis is the officer-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the officer level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Performance and promotions to Admiralty
[1] [2]
Promoted Admiral
Mean of dependent variable 0.010 0.010
Battle performance 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Connected -0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.006)
Battle performance × Connected 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Year FEs Y Y
Entry-year FEs Y
Officer FEs Y
Sample Post-captains
Observations 24,604 36,604
Notes: The unit of analysis is the captain-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the officer level.
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Table A4: Heterogeneity by naval family ties
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Battle performance
Mean of dependent variable 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.832
Connected promotee × Post 0.516** 0.638*** 0.460** 0.577**
(0.201) (0.227) (0.205) (0.230)
Father naval officer × Post 1.026*** 1.004**
(0.394) (0.398)
Connected promotee × Post -1.331** -1.297**
× Father naval officer (0.532) (0.546)
Uncle naval officer × Post 0.703 0.546
(0.553) (0.580)
Connected promotee × Post 0.084 0.234
× Uncle naval officer (0.950) (0.955)
Year-around-promotion FEs Y Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,403 8,403 8,403 8,403
Notes: The unit of analysis is the captain-year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the officer level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics - Fleet/Flotilla actions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Mean SD IQR Obs.
Enemy ship captured 0.138 0.419 0 1,959
Own ship captured 0.020 0.141 0 1,959
Ship guns 52.18 24.61 42 1,959
Ratio # own ships/ # enemy ships 0.577 0.196 0.268 1,959
Ratio total # guns / total # enemy guns 0.626 0.201 0.316 1,959
Connected promotees 0.207 0.405 0 1,959
Notes: The unit of observation is the officer-ship-battle.
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Table A6: Balance table – Single-ship actions
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Promoted Diff
Connected Unconnected (1)-(2) Obs.
Own guns 35.91 28.58 7.33*** 172
(2.58)
Enemy ship guns 31.57 30.49 1.07 166
(3.05)
Ratio # own guns / # enemy guns 1.28 1.10 0.17 166
(0.11)
Enemy men 268.07 248.70 19.36 128
(31.95)
Own capture 0.083 0.088 -0.005 172
(0.048)
Enemy capture 0.791 0.556 0.235*** 172
(0.080)
Notes: The unit of observation is the single-ship action. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A7: Admiral-specific merit, bias and wartime
[1] [2] [3]
Merit Merit Bias
Bias -0.446***
(0.063)
War 0.036** -0.015
(0.014) (0.017)
Year FEs Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y
Observations 160 160 160
Notes: The unit of observation is the year. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A8: More meritorious promotions during wartime
[1] [2] [3]
Promoted to post-captain=1
Mean of dependent variable 0.099 0.099 0.099
Battle performance 0.093*** 0.072*** 0.077***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Connected 0.022 -0.003 0.003
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
Battle performance × Connected 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.036)
Connected ×War 0.040* 0.032
(0.021) (0.020)
Battle performance ×War 0.023* 0.018
(0.012) (0.012)
Battle performance ×War × Connected 0.062*
(0.037)
Year FEs Y Y Y
Officer FEs Y Y Y
Observations 38,179 38,179 38,179
Notes: The unit of analysis is the officer-capture event. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the officer level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Royal Navy size and fighting events
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Figure A2: Promotions to post-captain and share of connected officers
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C Appendix Model Proofs
Proposition 1: Complementarity in performance and connections. The link
between promotion and performance is stronger for those agents who are connected to
the principal: ∂E[U |g,j=1]∂g >
∂E[U |g,j=0]
∂g .
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Proof: Using Equation (1) to differentiate with respect to g, we obtain
∂E[U |g, j]
∂g
=
σ2
σ2 + σ2εj
(4)
∂E[U |g, j = 1]
∂g
− ∂E[U |g, j = 0]
∂g
= 1− σ
2
σ2 + σ2ε0
> 0 (5)
Here we use σ2ε1 = 0 (Assumption 2) and the inequalities 0 < σ
2
σ2+σ2ε0
< 1.
Proposition 2: Performance and promotions. In the absence of bias, connected
promotees outperform unconnected promotees on average. The positive performance
gap between connected and unconnected promotees declines as bias increases. Al-
though connected promotees outperform unconnected promotees if bias is sufficiently
small, there is a threshold b > b¯ above which connected promotees underperform rela-
tive to unconnected promotees.
Proof: By Equation (1) and Assumption 2 (σ2ε1 = 0), the principal will
promote the connected agent over the unconnected agent only if E[U |g, j =
1] > E[U |g, j = 0]
g + b1 >
σ2
σ2 + σ2ε0
g +
(
1− σ
2
σ2 + σ2ε0
)
µ0 (6)
g > µ0 − σ
2 + σ2ε0
σ2ε0
b1 (7)
No-bias benchmark: Let b = 0 in Equation (7). In that case, the principal
promotes connected agents only if their performance exceeds the average of
unconnected agents.
We can use Equation (7) to write the expected difference between the per-
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formance of connected and unconnected agents as
E[g|g > µ0 − σ
2 + σ2ε0
σ2ε0
b1, j = 1]− E[g|j = 0] (8)
= −(µ0 − µ1) + σ
ϕ
 (µ0−µ1)−σ2+σ2ε0σ2ε0 b1
σ

1− Φ
 (µ0−µ1)−σ2+σ2ε0σ2ε0 b1
σ
 (9)
here we use that the sum of two normally distributed random variables g =
a + ε is distributed as N(µj , σ2 + σ20), with σ2ε1 = 0 (Assumption 2). Setting
b = 0 now yields
E[g|g > µ0, j = 1]− E[g|j = 0] = −(µ0 − µ1) + σ
ϕ(µ0−µ1σ )
1− Φ(µ0−µ1σ )
(10)
which is always positive given that µ0 ≥ µ1 (Assumption 1) and the inequality
ϕ(z)
1−Φ(z) > z for z = (µ0 − µ1)/σ.
Positive bias: We start with the Equation (9). If b1 → 0 then we are back to
the first best, where connected agents weakly outperform unconnected agents
in expectation (Proposition 1). If b1 → ∞, then the performance gap will be
−(µ0 − µ1) ≤ 0 (Assumption 1). Since Equation (9) is a continuous function
and is also monotonically declining in b1, there must be a threshold b¯ below
which connected promotees outperform and above which they underperform.
D Appendix Survival Analysis
The promotion data can be analyzed using survival methods – that is, because
every promotion to post-rank is an absorbing state.
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Figure A3: Promotion hazard rates by connectedness over time
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Figure A3 shows that connected officers were promoted much more rapidly;
almost all promotions took place within 20 years of an officer passing for lieu-
tenant. How did performance and connectedness interact? Before examining
this question econometrically, we plot simple survival curves as a function of
(i) connectedness and (ii) performance (see Figure A4). We define ”high per-
formance” as commanders who have accumulated at least two actions.
In both of these figures, blue lines indicate the share of unconnected offi-
cers who have not yet been promoted, and red lines indicate their connected
peers in the same circumstances. . In Figure A4, dashed (resp. solid) lines
represent high-performing (resp. low-performing) officers. The results show
that (a) both connected and unconnected promotees gained from performance
and (b) unconnected but high-performing officers did about as well as the con-
nected but ”normal” officers. The graph also suggests that the gains from per-
formance are greater for those who were connected: the difference between
solid and dashed lines is larger and increases more rapidly for connected than
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Figure A4: Promotion hazard rates by connectedness and performance
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for unconnected promotees.
Next, we estimate the determinants of the time to promotion using a stan-
dard Cox proportional hazard model:
Dit = Do(t)exp(αcit + βqit + γPit × cit) + εit (11)
in this expression,Dit is the risk of promotion andD0(t) is the baseline haz-
ard function evaluated at year t (i.e., the baseline likelihood of promotion); α
measures the effect of being connected (cit), and β the effect of performance
(qit), again defined as the cumulative number of actions and captures; and γ,
the coefficient of interest, captures the added effect of performance on promo-
tion prospects for connected officers. Figure A5 plots – separately for connected
and unconnected officers – the promotion hazard rates as a function of cumu-
lative performance. Better performance translates into faster promotion, and
especially so for Admiralty-connected officers.
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Figure A5: Promotion hazard rates by connectedness
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The crucial question in our setting is whether performance paid off more for
connected than for unconnected officers. Since the effect of γ depends on Pit, it
follows that the interaction’s significance cannot be determined simply by just
looking at its t-statistic. Instead, we calculate the conditional marginal effect of
being connected as a function of performance. Figure A6 presents the result by
plotting ∂D∂C . The higher the performance, the greater the derivative of promo-
tion with respect to connectedness. Thus the additional increase in promotion
prospects is always higher for connected officers and always increasing with
the number of enemy actions and captures. The magnitude of the effect also
grows; with even a single event it is already above unity (lower bound = 1.38),
and it then increases thereafter with every extra step on the performance scale.
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Figure A6: Difference in promotion hazard rates by connectedness
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